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Abstract: Runtime enforcement (RE) is a technique where a so-called monitor modifies the execution
of a system to comply with a desired property. RE consists in using a so called monitor to modify
an input sequence of events so that it complies with the property. Very few convincing applications
of runtime enforcement have been proposed so far since most of the proposed approaches remain
on the theoretical level. In network security, RE monitors can detect and prevent Denial-of-Service
attacks. In resource allocation, RE monitors can ensure fairness. Specifications in these domains express
data-constraints over the received events where the timing between events matters. To formalize these
requirements, we introduce Parameterized Timed Automata with Variables (PTAVs), an extension of
Timed Automata (TAs) with internal and external variables. We then extend enforcement for TAs to
enforcement for PTAVs. We model requirements from the considered application domains and show
how enforcement monitors can ensure system correctness w.r.t. these requirements. Finally, we propose
a prototype implementation to experiment RE monitors on some properties. Our experiments and the
performance of RE monitors demonstrate the feasibility of our approach.
Keywords:Monitoring, Runtime Enforcement, Timed Automaton, Parametric property.
1. INTRODUCTION
Observing the behavior of a system and checking its compli-
ance to a given user-provided specification (describing the in-
tended behavior of the system) has been referred under different
names such as passive testing or runtime verification. Going
further, runtime enforcement is a technique aiming at ensuring
that a (possibly incorrect) observation input to the (so-called)
monitor is transformed and output as a correct observation.
Many theoretical frameworks have been proposed for the
runtime enforcement of high-level specifications on systems
(cf. Falcone et al. (2011) or Falcone (2010) for an overview). In
these frameworks, an enforcement monitor is (automatically)
obtained from a specification, and acts as a “filter” on (some
observable and controllable representation) of the behavior of
the system, possibly using an auxiliary memory. It is worth
mentioning that runtime enforcement differs from supervisory-
control as enforcement monitors are usually plugged at the exit
or entrance of the system, but does not modify its internal
behavior, contrarily to controllers. Moreover, in enforcement
monitoring, knowing the property to be enforced is sufficient,
and we don’t require knowledge or model of the system. In en-
forcement frameworks, specifications are formalized as propo-
sitional properties (i.e., sets of words over a propositional al-
phabet) and executions are words over the considered alphabet.
Enforcement monitors input a word and suppress, insert, or re-
order events so as to output a word that complies to the property.
A limitation to the applicability of theoretical approaches
to runtime enforcement is the expressiveness of the consid-
ered specification formalisms. In most modern application do-
mains, propositional specification formalisms are not expres-
sive enough to meet and formalize complex requirements. Time
and data are two particularly desirable features. In timed speci-
fications the physical time that elapses between two events mat-
ters, i.e., it influences satisfiability. Considering timed specifi-
cations in runtime techniques is intricate because the execution
time of the monitor, which is not part of the initial system, can
change the evaluation of an execution, w.r.t. the same execution
on the non-monitored system. Handling parameters in (the ver-
ification approaches of) monitoring is receiving a growing at-
tention. Parametric specifications feature events that carry data
from the execution of the monitored system. Few approaches
tackle parametric specifications (cf. Chen and Rosu (2009);
Barringer et al. (2012)). These approaches are concerned only
with verification and do not consider time.
The two following (simplified) properties of mail servers can-
not be specified using propositional specification formalisms.
R1 If the number of request messages from a client is greater
than max req , then there should be a delay of at least del
t.u. before responding positively to the client.
R2 After processing a request message from a client, if the
server response message is an error (user unknown or not
found), then there should be a delay of at least 10 t.u. before
sending this reply message back to the client.
To express these properties, we need features to express con-
straints over time and data. Moreover, the server has to differ-
entiate the messages from each client and treat them separately.
Features to keep track of some information internally, such as
the number of request messages received, are also necessary.
In this paper we make one step towards practical runtime en-
forcement by considering event-based specifications where i)
time between events matters and ii) events carry data values
from the monitored system. We refer to this problem as en-
forcement monitoring for parametric timed specifications. Be-
cause of the timing feature, we consider enforcement monitors
as time retardants. That is, monitors are endowed with only
one realistic feature (for the considered application domains):
being able to delay events. Monitors read a trace of events
and output the same trace where delays between consecutive
events are augmented to comply with a specification. Following
the compositional approach (the so-called “plugin approach”)
introduced in Chen and Rosu (2009), for a parametric timed
specification, the input trace is sliced according to the parameter
value of events, and redirected to the appropriate instance of
the monitor. Contrary to the plugin approach which focuses on
verification in the untimed case, events cannot be duplicated.
Thus, slicing should be performed in such a way that each event
is sent to only one enforcement monitor.
This paper extends runtime enforcement for non-parametric
(i.e., propositional) timed properties, introduced in Pinisetty
et al. (2012). We introduce Parametrized Timed Automata with
Variables (P-TAVs) (Sec. 3). The expressiveness features of P-
TAVs have been chosen as a balance between expressiveness
and efficiency of the synthesized enforcement monitors and
ensure that the previously mentioned requirement on slicing
holds. To guide us in the choice of expressiveness features we
considered requirements in several application domains. More-
over, we show how the “slicing” approach of Chen and Rosu
(2009) can be adapted to our specification formalism (Sec. 4).
Furthermore, we show how these application domains can ben-
efit from using runtime enforcement monitors synthesized from
requirements formalized as P-TAVs (Sec. 5). The enforcement
monitors synthesized from P-TAVs are able to ensure several
requirements in the considered application domains. Our ex-
periments validate our choice on the expressiveness of P-TAVs
and assess the efficiency of obtained enforcement monitors.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATION
Monitors input and output timed words. A timed word is a
sequence σ = e1 · e2 · · · en of events where ∀i ∈ [1, n] : ei =
(δi, ai(πi, ηi)). Action ai ∈ Σ is an action in an alphabetΣ, and
πi ∈ Dp is the value of parameter p, identifying the monitor
instance to which the action should be fed as input. ηi ∈ DV
is a vector of values of a tuple of variables V . We denote by
delay (δ, a (π, η))
def
= δ the projection of events on delays, by
σi, the ith event, and by time(σ) the total duration of σ, i.e.,
the sum of its delays. |σ| is used to denote the length of σ. The
projection of σ on actions is denoted by ΠΣ(σ).
For a given parameter value π, we denote by σ↓pi the projection
of σ on the actions carrying parameter value π, where delays
are summed up in the delay of the next action carrying π,
e.g., if σ = (0.5, a(1, η1)) · (0.3, a(2, η2)) · (0.2, a(1, η3)) ·
(0.4, a(2, η4)), then σ ↓1= (0.5, a(1, η1)) · (0.5, a(1, η3)) and
σ ↓2= (0.8, a(2, η2)) · (0.6, a(2, η4)).
Conversely, we (inductively) define the merge of several se-
quences related to different parameter values (where we omit
vectors of external variables for readability) as follows:
•merge{ǫ} = ǫ;
•merge{σ1, . . . , σn} = merge{σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σn} if σi = ǫ;
•merge
{
(δ1, a1(1)) · σ1, . . . , (δn, an(n)) · σn
}
=
let i s.t. δi = min{δj | j ∈ [1, n]} in (δi, ai(i))·
merge
{
(δ1 − δi, a1(1)) · σ1, . . . , σi, . . . , (δn − δi, an(n)) · σn
}
.
The merge of the empty sequence ǫ is the empty sequence. The
merge of a set of sequences that contains an empty sequence is
equal to the merge of this set where the empty sequence has
been removed. The merge of a set of non-empty sequences
is the sequence s.t. the first event is the one of the merged
sequences with the least delay (say the i-th sequence), and, the
remainder of the sequence is the merge of σi with the previous
sequences where δi is substracted from the delays of the first
events for the sequences with index different from i.
For example, if σ1 = (0.5, a(1, η1.1)) · (0.5, a(1, η1.2)) and
σ2 = (0.8, a(2, η2.1)) · (0.6, a(2, η2.2)) then merge{σ1, σ2} =
(0.5, a(1, η1.1)) · (0.3, a(2, η2.1)) · (0.2, a(1, η1.2)) ·
(0.4, a(2, η2.2)).
The domain of a trace σ, denoted by Dom(σ), is the set of
monitor instances (set of values appearing as the first parameter
of events in σ).
The observation of σ at time t is the longest prefix of σ with
duration lower than t: obs(σ, t)
def
=
max4{σ
′ ∈ (R≥0 × Λ)∗ | σ′ 4 σ ∧ time(σ′) ≤ t}where4
denotes the prefix ordering.
For σ, σ′ ∈ (R≥0 × Λ)∗, we say that σ′ delays σ (denoted
as σ′ 4d σ) if their projections on actions are ordered by
prefix (ΠΣ(σ
′) 4 ΠΣ(σ)) but delays in σ
′ may be increased:
∀i ≤ |σ′| : delay(σ′i) ≥ delay(σi).
3. PARAMETRIZED TIMED AUTOMATA WITH
VARIABLES
To handle requirements with constraints on data, events with
associated values, and separate input flows according to param-
eter values, we define an extension of timed automata called
Parametrized Timed Automata with Variables (P-TAV). P-TAVs
are partly inspired from Input-Output Symbolic Transition Sys-
tems (IOSTS) of Rusu et al. (2000), Timed Input-Output Sym-
bolic Transition Systems (TIOSTS) of Andrade et al. (2011),
parametric trace slicing of Chen and Rosu (2009) and Quanti-
fied Event Automata of Barringer et al. (2012) (see Sec. 7 for a
comparison). The features of P-TAVs have been chosen to fit a
balance between expressiveness (to express requirements from
some application domains - see Sec. 5) and runtime efficiency.
3.1 Definition
A P-TAV can be seen as a timed automaton with finite set
of locations, and a finite set of clocks used to represent time
evolution, extended with internal and external variables used
for representing system data. A transition comprises of an
action carrying values of external variables, a guard on internal
variables, external variables and clocks, and an assignment of
internal variables, and reset of clocks. External variables model
the data carried by the actions from the monitored system,
and internal variables are used for internal computation. For a
variable v, Dv denotes its domain, and for a tuple of variables
V = 〈v1, . . . , vn〉, DV is the product domain Dv1 × · · · ×Dvn .
A predicate P (V ) on a tuple of variables V is a logical formula
whose semantics is a function DV → {true, false}, and
can also be seen as the subset of DV which maps to true. A
valuation of the variables in V is a mapping ν which maps every
variable v ∈ V to a value ν(v) in Dv .
Given X a set of clocks, and R≥0 the set of non-negative real
numbers, a clock valuation is a mapping χ : X → R≥0. If χ is a
valuation overX and t ∈ R≥0, then χ+ t denotes the valuation
that assigns χ(x) + t to every x ∈ X . For X ′ ⊆ X , χ[X′←0]
denotes the valuation equal to χ on X \X ′ and assigning 0 to
all clocks in X ′.
Definition 1. (Syntax of P-TAVs). A P-TAV is a tuple
〈p, V, C,Θ, L, l0, LG, X,Σp,∆〉 where:
- p is a parameter ranging over a countable set Dp ;
- V is a tuple of typed internal variables and C is a tuple of
external variables;
- Θ ⊆ D{p}∪V the initial condition, is a computable predicate
over V and p;
- L is a finite non-empty set of locations, with l0 ∈ L the initial
location, and LG ⊆ L the set of accepting locations;
- Σ is a non-empty finite set of actions, and an action a ∈ Σ
has a signature sig(a) = 〈t0, t1, . . . , tk〉 which is a tuple of
types of the external variables, where t0 = Dp is the type of
the parameter p;
- X is a finite set of clocks;
- ∆ is a finite set of transitions, and each transition t ∈ ∆ is a
tuple 〈l, a, p, c,G,A, l′〉 also written
l
a(p,c),G(V,p,c),V ′:=A(V,p,c)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ l′ such that,
• l, l′ ∈ L are respectively the origin and target locations of
the transition;
• a ∈ Σ is the action, p is the parameter and c = 〈c1, . . . ck〉
is a tuple of external variables local to the transition;
• G = GD ∧GX is the guard where
* GD ⊆ DV × Dsig(a) is a computable predicate over
internal variables, the parameter and external variables
in V ∪ {p} ∪ c;
* GX is a clock constraint overX defined as a conjunction
of constraints of the form x♯f(V ∪ {p} ∪ c), where
x ∈ X and f(V ∪ {p} ∪ c) is a computable function,
and ♯ ∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >};
• A=(AD, AX) is the assignment of the transition where
* AD : DV × Dsig(a) → DV defines the evolution of
internal variables.
* AX ⊆ X is the set of clocks to be reset.
A P-TAVA(p) should be understood as a pattern, where param-
eter p is a constant defined at runtime. For a value π of p, the
instance of A(p) is denoted as A(π). P-TAVs allow to describe
a set of identical timed automata extended with internal and
external variables that only differ by the value of p. In Sec. 4
we explain how a parametric enforcement monitor generated
from a P-TAV is instantiated into a set of monitors (generated
on-the-fly), one for each value of p, each observing the cor-
responding projection σ ↓pi of the input timed word σ. This
thus allows for example to tackle timed words corresponding to
several sessions of a web service where each session is treated
independently.
Remark 1. (Multiple parameters). For the sake of simpler no-
tations, P-TAVs are presented with only one parameter p. P-
TAVs can handle a tuple of parameters. Using some indexing
mechanism, each combination of values of the parameters can
be mapped to a unique value.
Let A(p) = 〈p, V, C,Θ, L, l0, LG, X,Σ,∆〉 be a P-TAV. For
a value π of parameter p, the semantics of the instance A(π)
is a timed transition system, where states explore the set of
locations, valuations of internal variables V and clocks X , and
transitions explore pairs of delays inR≥0 and actions associated
with values of the parameter and external variables in C. 1
1 Considering a tuple of parameters instead of a single parameter will not have
any effect on the semantics of a P-TAV.
l0 l1
ΣP1
sId
\ {R1 .alloc(sId)}
R1 .alloc(sId),
counter := 1, x := 0, y := 0 Σ
P1
sId
\ {R1 .alloc(sId)}
R1 .alloc(sId),
x < reset ∧ y ≥ delay ,
counter ++, y := 0
R1 .alloc(sId),
x ≥ reset ,
counter := 1, x := 0, y := 0
(a) Increase delay according to the accesses to a service.
l0 l1
ΣP2
sId
\ {R1 .rel(sId)}
R1 .rel(sId),
x := 0
ΣP2
sId
\ {R1 .alloc(sId),R2 .alloc(sId)}
R2 .alloc(sId),
x ≥ 2
R1 .alloc(sId)
(b) At least 2 t.u. before allocating
R2 after releasing R1.
l0 l1
R1 .alloc(sId),
x := 0
ΣP3
sId
\ {R1 .alloc(sId)},
x ≥ T
(c) At least T t.u. before
operating on a resource.
Fig. 1. P-TAVS for resource allocation.
Definition 2. (Semantics of P-TAVs). For a value π of p, the
semantics of A(π), is a timed transition system [[A(π)]] =
〈Q, q0, QG,Γ,→〉, defined as follows:
- Q = L×DV × (X → R≥0), is the set of states of the form
q = 〈l, ν, χ〉 where l ∈ L is a location, ν ∈ DV is a valuation
of internal variables, χ is a valuation of clocks;
- Q0 = {〈l0, ν, χ[X←0]〉 | Θ(π, ν) = true} is the set of initial
states;
- QG = LG×DV × (X → R≥0) is the set of accepting states;
- Γ = R≥0 × Λ where Λ = {a(π, η) | a ∈ Σ ∧ (π, η) ∈
Dsig(a)} is the set of transition labels;
- →⊆ Q × Γ × Q the transition relation is the smallest set of
transitions of the form 〈l, ν, χ〉
(δ,a(pi,η))
−−−−−−→〈l′, ν′, χ′〉 such that
∃〈l, a, p, c,G,A, l′〉 ∈ ∆, with GX(χ + δ) ∧ GD(ν, π, η)
evaluating to true, ν′ = AD(ν, π, η) and χ′ = (χ +
δ)[AX ← 0].
A run ρ of [[A(π)]] from a state q ∈ Q is a sequence of moves
of the form: ρ = q
(δ1,a1(pi,η1))
−−−−−−−−→ q1 · · · qn−1
(δn,an(pi,ηn))
−−−−−−−−−→
qn, for some n ∈ N. Accepted runs are runs starting in Q0
and ending in QG. The trace of a run ρ is a timed word
σ = (δ1, a1(π, η1)) · · · (δn, an(π, ηn)) obtained by projection
on pairs of delays and actions associated with the parameter
value and values of external variables. The set of traces of
accepted runs is noted TraceQG(A(π)).
A trace σ from the system is accepted byA(p) if for each value
π of p appearing in the trace, the projection of σ corresponding
to π is an accepted run of the instance A(π): ∀π ∈ Dom(σ) :
σ↓pi∈ TraceQG(A(π)).
Safety P-TAVs. In this paper, we shall only consider parametric
timed safety properties that can be represented by P-TAVs. 2
Definition 3. (Safety P-TAV). A P-TAV A(p) =
〈p, V, C,Θ, L, l0, LG, X,Σ,∆〉 is said to be a safety P-TAV if
l0 ∈ LG ∧ ∄〈l, a, p, c,G,A, l′〉 ∈ ∆ : l ∈ L \ LG ∧ l′ ∈ LG.
Then, for any instanceA(π), its associated property is ϕA(pi) =
TraceQG(A(π)) and σ |= ϕA(pi) is for σ ∈ TraceQG(A(π)).
The parametric timed safety property associated to A(p) is the
set of sets of traces ϕA(p) = {ϕA(pi) | π ∈ Dp}.
2 The results of Pinisetty et al. (2012) for (propositional) co-safety properties
can be lifted to parametric co-safety properties in a similar fashion.
3.2 A motivating example
Concurrent accesses to shared resources by various services can
lead to a Denial of Service (DoS) because of e.g., starvation
or deadlock. We can formalize requirements for resource allo-
cation and DoS prevention using P-TAVs. The P-TAV shown
in Fig. 1a models the property “There should be a dynamic
delay between two allocation requests to the same resource by
a service. This delay increases as the number of allocations
increases and also depends on the service id”. Squares denote
accepting locations. Non-accepting locations can be omitted in
(the representation of) safety P-TAVs.
We now explain the different notions of the P-TAV model
through this example. The P-TAV in Fig. 1a keeps track of the
number of allocations of a resource to a service, and increases
the delay between allocations as the number of allocations
increases. It has the set of actions ΣsId = {R1 .alloc(sId),
R1 .setMA(sId ,maxAlloc)}. The tuple of internal variables is
〈counter , reset , delay〉, and the tuple of external variables is
〈maxAlloc〉. The variable counter is an integer incremented
after each R1 .alloc(sId) event, and maxAlloc is an integer
that defines the allowed number ofR1 .alloc(sId)messages per
each increment of the delay. Note that the variablemaxAlloc is
an external variable since it is the data that is received via the
action R1 .setMA(sId ,maxAlloc). The variable reset defines
the time period for resetting the counter, and delay is defined
as 0 if counter < maxAlloc and int
(
counter∗sId
maxAlloc
)
otherwise.
4. ENFORCEMENT MONITORING OF PARAMETRIC
TIMED PROPERTIES
In Pinisetty et al. (2012), enforcement monitors are synthesized
from propositional safety and co-safety timed properties mod-
eled as timed automata. We first recall the basic principles for
safety properties, and lift them to parametric timed properties
modeled with P-TAVs.
4.1 The propositional case
The input/output behavior of an enforcement monitor is speci-
fied by an enforcement function.
Definition 4. For a given timed safety property ϕ, an enforce-
ment function is a function Eϕ from (R≥0 × Σ)∗ × R≥0 to
(R≥0 × Σ)∗.
The enforcement function Eϕ transforms some input timed
word σ which is possibly incorrect w.r.t. ϕ. The outputEϕ(σ, t)
at time t is a timed word with same actions, but possibly in-
creased delays between actions to satisfy the property. Some
requirements are defined on the enforcement function: sound-
ness, transparency and optimality. Soundness means that the
output of an enforcement mechanism should satisfy the prop-
erty. Transparency expresses how an enforcement mechanism
is allowed to correct the input sequence: the output sequence
delays the input sequence. Optimality expresses how to best
choose the delays to release the output as soon as possible.
Formal constraints, detailed in Pinisetty et al. (2012), depend
on the considered class of properties. We recall them for safety
properties, at an abstract level.
Definition 5. (Soundness, transparency, optimality). An enforce-
ment function Eϕ : (R≥0 × Σ)∗ × R≥0 → (R≥0 × Σ)∗ for a
safety property ϕ is:
- sound for an input timed word σ if at any time, the output
satisfies the property: ∀t ∈ R≥0 : Eϕ(σ, t) |= ϕ; noted
sound(Eϕ, σ);
- transparent for an input timed word σ, if at any time t,
the output delays the input observed at time t: ∀t ∈ R≥0 :
Eϕ(σ, t) 4d obs(σ, t); noted transparent(Eϕ, σ);
- optimal: if Eϕ(σ, t) is among the longest correct timed
words delaying obs(σ, t), and, every prefix of Eϕ(σ, t) has
the shortest possible last delay; noted optimal(Eϕ, σ);
Example 1. (soundness, transparency and optimality). Consider
the property shown in Fig. 1a. Let the initial values of variables
delay and reset be 5 and 100, respectively. Consider the input
sequence σ = (2,R1 .alloc(1)) · (2,R1 .alloc(1)).
We illustrate the soundness, transparency and optimality con-
straints, on the monitor instance with parameter value sId = 1.
Let the output of the monitor instance EϕA(1) for the input
sequence σ be (2,R1 .alloc(1)) · (5,R1 .alloc(1)). EϕA(1) is
sound since its output satisfies the property. EϕA(1) is trans-
parent since the delays of all events are greater than or equal
to the actual delays in σ. EϕA(1) is optimal since the de-
lays are the shortest possible, to satisfy the property. Note,
(2,R1 .alloc(1)) · (6,R1 .alloc(1)) also satisfies soundness and
transparency, but not optimality, since 5 is the shortest possible
delay of the second event.
At an abstract level, the actual definitions of the enforcement
function and monitor rely on theUpdate function. TheUpdate
function keeps track of the current state (in the semantics of)
the timed automaton, takes an input (timed) action and then
Update(q, (δ, a)) is the smallest (optimal) delay δ′ greater than
or equal to δ allowing the TA to remain in an accepting location
when triggering the action a while being in q.
An enforcement function Eϕ is implemented by an enforce-
ment monitor (EM) defined as a transition system. Roughly
speaking, an EM is equipped with a memory and the following
enforcement operations:
- Store reads an input event (δ, a), computes the optimal delay
δ′ associated with a, and stores (δ′, a) in memory where δ′ is
computed by the Update function.
- Dump releases the first action a stored in memory as (δ′, a),
when the time elapsed since the previous dump operation is
equal to δ′.
- Idle only allows time to elapse, and neither receives nor
releases actions.
The configuration of an EM consists of the timed word in
memory, two clocks keeping track of the time since the last
store and last dump operations, the current location of the
automaton representing the property (the state reached after the
concatenation of the released output and the memory), and a
Boolean indicating if this location is accepting.
For any property ϕ, we generate an EM, and the enforcement
function Eϕ implemented by the EM is sound transparent and
optimal. For any input σ, at any time t, the output of the
enforcement function Eϕ, and output behavior of the associ-
ated EM are equal. An enforcement function describes in a
declarative manner the input-output behavior of an enforcement
monitor, whereas the enforcement monitor is an operational de-
scription. At any time t, the input obs(σ, t) is the concatenation
of all events read by EM (Store) over various steps, until time
t. At any time t, the output is the concatenation of all released
events (Dump) until t.
The EM definition, with detailed description of the operations
is in Pinisetty et al. (2012). Here, we explain the operations
briefly via an example.
Example 2. (Enforcement operations). Consider again the sce-
nario described in Example 1. We illustrate the enforcement op-
erations, on the monitor instance with parameter value sId = 1
and input sequence σ = (2,R1 .alloc(1)) · (2,R1 .alloc(1)).
Since the first R1 .alloc(1) event is observed after 2 time units,
store or dump operations cannot be applied, and time elapses
using the idle operation. The EM reads the first R1 .alloc(1)
event after 2 time units using the store operation, and stores
(2,R1 .alloc(1)) in the memory, meaning that the EM can
release R1 .alloc(1) using the dump operation without in-
troducing additional delay. Again, idle operation is used to
let time elapse, and after 2 more time units, the second
R1 .alloc(1) event is read. Then, when applying the store rule,
(5,R1 .alloc(1)) is stored in memory, where 5 is the optimal
delay computed by the update function. Since an additional
delay of 3 time units is needed in the output, EM can release
this event using the dump operation and after letting 3 more
time units elapse using the idle operation.
4.2 The Parametric Case
The techniques of the propositional case can be adapted to
generate a parametric enforcement function/monitor from a
P-TAV A(p) with parameter p. For space reasons, we only
describe the adaptation of enforcement functions. The main
adaptation lies in the definition of the Update function to
compute optimal delays, taking into account the semantics of P-
TAVs instead of the semantics of TAs. Indeed, for an instance
A(π), given the state q reached after a given timed trace σ, a
delay δ and the next action a(π, η) in this trace, Update is the
optimal delay δ′ greater than δ for the next action to stay in
accepting states. Formally, Update(q, a(π, η), δ) = min(D) if
D 6= ∅, and∞ otherwise, whereD = {δ′ ∈ R≥0 | ∃q1 ∈ QG :
q
(δ′,a(pi,η))
→ q1 ∧ δ
′ ≥ δ} is the set of delays that allow to reach
an accepting state from q and the next action.
Note that Update is computable as the parameter value π is
a constant known at runtime, the state q (values of internal
variables ν and location) and the external variables η are
known, and it is assumed in Definition 1 that guards and
assignments are computable.
It is then not hard to adapt the proofs of Pinisetty et al. (2012)
to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Given a safety P-TAV A(p) specifying a para-
metric timed safety property ϕA(p), for all π ∈ Dp, the enforce-
ment function EϕA(pi) , obtained by following the definition in
the propositional case and with the above adaptations, is sound,
transparent, and optimal w.r.t. A(π), as per Definition 5.
Indexed enforcement monitors and slicing.
ϕA(p)
EϕA(p)(σ, t) σ
Parametric Enforcement
EϕA(1)
. . .
. . .
σ ↓1
EϕA(2)
σ ↓2
EϕA(2)(σ↓2, t)
EϕA(1)(σ↓1, t)
Fig. 2: Global Scenario
The proposed strategy uses
indexed enforcement mon-
itors and slicing of Chen
and Rosu (2009) that is sim-
plified in a way slicing is
meaningful for runtime en-
forcement. 3
For each value π of param-
eter p, we have an instance
3 Moreover, we do not discuss the dynamic creation of monitors when new
values are observed in the trace. At runtime, upon a new event, a new instance
of enforcement function/monitor is simply created if the parameter value has
not been seen by reading previous events.
of the corresponding enforcement function and enforcement
monitor. For example, EϕA(1) is an instance of the enforce-
ment function for ϕA(1). The input to the monitor σ consists
of events with different values of parameter p. However, each
enforcement function EϕA(pi) takes as input only the projection
σ↓pi of σ on actions with parameter value π. The global output
is obtained by merging the outputs of all enforcement functions.
Definition 6. (Parametric Enforcement Function). The enforce-
ment function Eϕp(σ, t) : (R≥0 × Λ)
∗ × R≥0 → (R≥0 × Λ)∗
for P-TAV A(p) is defined as:
Eϕp(σ, t) = let n = |Dom(σ)| in
let opi = EϕA(pi)(σ↓pi, t), for π ∈ [1, n], in
obs
(
merge({o1, . . . , on}), t
)
.
The global output of the enforcement function is defined as
the observation of the merge of the local outputs (o1, . . . , on)
produced by the enforcement functions synthesized for P-TAV
instances that read local projections (σ ↓pi , π ∈ [1, n]) of the
global trace σ. However, as each projection of the input stream
corresponding to a value π of p is treated independently, with
respect to the product of EϕA(pi) , π ∈ Dp, the global output
Eϕp(σ, t) remains sound (in the sense that the output satisfies
ϕA(p)), but is neither transparent nor optimal. In particular, the
architecture allows to reorder independent output flows, even
though each flow is not reordered.
Consequently, the following definitions of parametric sound-
ness, transparency and optimality stem from the fact that, using
an indexed strategy, enforcement monitors act and output events
independently.
Definition 7. (Parametric soundness, transparency, optimality).
A parametric enforcement function Eϕp : (R≥0 × Λ)
∗ ×
R≥0 → (R≥0 × Λ)∗ for a P-TAV A(p) with parameter p is:
- sound if for any input timed word σ, for any possible value
π of p, at any time, the output obtained from the projection
of the input timed word on π, satisfies the property: ∀π ∈
Dom(p), ∀σ ∈ (R≥0 × Λ)∗ : sound(EϕA(pi) , σ↓pi);
- transparent if for any input timed word σ, for any possible
value π of p, at any time t, the output obtained from the
projection of the input timed word on π delays the input
observed at time t: ∀π ∈ Dom(p), ∀σ ∈ (R≥0 × Λ)∗ :
transparent(EϕA(pi) , σ↓pi);
- optimal if EϕA(pi)(σ, t) is among the longest correct timed
words delaying obs(σ↓pi, t), and, every prefix ofEϕA(pi)(σ, t)
has the shortest possible last delay, for all values π of p:
∀π ∈ Dom(p), ∀σ ∈ (R≥0 × Λ)∗ : optimal(EϕA(pi) , σ↓pi).
where predicates sound , transparent and optimal are lifted to
parametric traces.
Using Proposition 1, Definitions 6 and 7 and the results
from Pinisetty et al. (2012), one can prove the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2. Given a safety P-TAV A(p) specifying a para-
metric timed safety property ϕA(p), the enforcement function
Eϕp as per Definition 6 is sound, transparent and optimal with
respect to A(π), as per Definition 7.
Example 3. Consider again the scenario described in Exam-
ple 1. Consider the input sequence σ = (2,R1 .alloc(1)) ·
(1,R1 .alloc(2)) · (1,R1 .alloc(1)). Here, Dom(σ) = {1, 2},
and thus we have two monitor instances and both are sound,
transparent and optimal. The projection of the input se-
quence on the actions carrying parameter value 1 is σ ↓1=
(2,R1 .alloc(1)) · (2,R1 .alloc(1)), which is input to EϕA(1) ,
and the output of EϕA(1) is (2,R1 .alloc(1)) · (5,R1 .alloc(1)),
satisfying soundness, transparency and optimality. The projec-
tion of the input sequence on the actions carrying parameter
value 2 is σ ↓2= (3,R1 .alloc(2)), which is input to EϕA(2) ,
and the output of EϕA(2) is (3,R1 .alloc(2)), satisfying sound-
ness, transparency and optimality.
5. LEVERAGING RUNTIME ENFORCEMENT IN SOME
APPLICATION DOMAINS
Let us illustrate how we can leverage runtime enforcement of
parametric timed properties in some application domains. For
each application domain, we provide requirements modeled as
P-TAVs from which we synthesize enforcement monitors that
try to maintain the P-TAV in accepting locations by introducing
some delays when necessary and possible.
Using P-TAVs we obtain abstract and concise representations
of the requirements. Enforcement monitors are a lightweight,
modular, and flexible implementation of these requirements,
and, they prevent problems in these application domains.
5.1 Resource Allocation
Let us consider a common client-server model used in dis-
tributed applications and web servers (described in Fradet and
Hong Tuan Ha (2010)). A system consists of three layers:
clients, services and shared resources. Clients send their re-
quests to services and wait for their response. Requests to a
service are stored in a FIFO queue, and a service processes
them sequentially. To process a request, a service has to make
some computation using resources such as processors, files and
network connection managers. Concurrent accesses to shared
resources by various services may lead to a DoS because of
problems such as starvation when a service cannot allocate
a shared resource, or deadlock when two services wait for a
resource allocated to the other service.
Leveraging runtime enforcement for fair resource alloca-
tion. In Fradet and Hong Tuan Ha (2010), a domain-specific
aspect language to prevent DoS caused by improper resource
management is presented. Inspiring from this work, we for-
malize (richer) requirements for resource allocation and DoS
prevention using P-TAVs. The event R1 .alloc(sId) (resp.
R2 .alloc(sId)) corresponds to the allocation of R1 (resp. R2),
andR1 .rel(sId) (resp.R2 .rel(sId)) corresponds to the release
of R1 (resp. R2) in the session sId . The requirements are listed
below.
P1 There should be a dynamic delay between two allocation
requests to the same resource by a service (Fig. 1a).
P2 After releasing R1, there should be a delay of at least 2 t.u.
before allocating R2 (Fig. 1b).
P3 After a resource is acquired by a service, the service
has to wait at least for T t.u. before performing oper-
ations on the resource. The set of events is ΣP3sId =
{R1 .alloc(sId),R1 .op1 (sId),R1 .op2 (sId)} where op1 ,
and op2 are possible operations on a resource.
Using the indexed approach described in Section 4, for each
requirement a parametric enforcement monitor can be derived
from the requirement modeled as a P-TAV formalizing the
requirement. One monitor instance is associated to each service
instance.
5.2 Robust Mail Servers
Context.Many protocols (e.g., Simple Mail Transfer Protocol,
SMTP) are used by email clients and servers to send and relay
messages. After connecting to a server, a client should provide a
MAIL FROM message with sender’s address as argument, and
an RCPT TOmessage with receiver’s address as argument. The
server responds with an OK 250 message if the addresses are
valid. The client waits for the server response to transmit data.
The spam issue. A high volume of spam messages can cause
a Denial of Service (DoS). Slowing down SMTP conversations
can refrain automated spam. Intentionally introducing delays
between messages in a network is known as tarpitting ( Hunter
et al. (2003)). Tarpitting reduces the spam sending rate and
prevents servers from processing a large number of spams.
Leveraging runtime enforcement to protect mail servers.
Runtime enforcement mechanisms can be used as tarpits on
mail servers to protect them. The expressiveness of P-TAVs also
allows to model dynamic tarpits, where the delay introduced
between messages can be increased (or decreased) based on the
observed pattern of messages sent by a client over time. When
a client establishes a connection, an instance of enforcement
monitor can be created on-the-fly, to monitor all the incom-
ing/outgoing messages of that particular session.
We consider an architectural setting where enforcement moni-
tors run on a server. The input events to the monitors are both
from the client and the server. Monitors delay the response from
the server according to the client’s behavior.
Let us see some requirements and P-TAVs parameterized by a
client identifier (id ).
R1 If the number of RCPT TO messages from a client is greater
thanmax req , then there should be a delay of at least del t.u.
before responding an OK 250 to the client.
Requirement R1is formalized by the P-TAV in Fig. 3a. The
delay is computed dynamically and depends on the number
of received rcpt to(id)messages. The delay del is defined as
0 if counter < max req and int( counter
max req
) otherwise. Upon
receiving an rcpt to(id) message, if counter ≤ max req ,
the P-TAV moves from l0 to l1. Otherwise, the P-TAV goes
to l2, resetting the clock x. Upon receiving an ok 250 (id),
the P-TAV moves from l1 to l0, or from l2 to l0 if x ≥ del .
R2 After processing an RCPT TO message from a client, if the
server response message is ERROR 550 (user unknown or
not found), then there should be a delay of at least 10 t.u.
before sending this reply message back to the client.
Requirement R2 is formalized by the P-TAV in Fig. 3b.
R3 If the number of RCPT TOmessages is greater thanmax req
and the response of the server is OK 250 (resp. ERROR 550)
then there should be a delay of at least 5 (resp. 10) t.u. before
sending the response.
R3 is formalized by the P-TAV in Fig. 3c.
R4 This requirement is formalized by the P-TAV in Fig. 3d.
Compared to the P-TAV for R1, an additional feature is
handled: counter is reset according to the computed delay,
if there is sufficient time between two rcpt to(id) messages
from the client.
The enforcement monitors synthesized from these requirements
(modeled as P-TAVs), when integrated with the server can
prevent the server from processing a large number of spam
messages.
l0 l1l2
ΣP1
id
\ {rcpt to(id)}
rcpt to(id),
counter < max req ,
counter ++
rcpt to(id),
counter ≥ max req ,
counter ++, x := 0
setMR(id ,max req)
ok 250 (id)
setMR(id ,max req)
ok 250 (id)),
x ≥ del
setMR(id ,max req)
(a) Compute delay dynamically
l0 l1
ΣP2
id
\ {rcpt to(id)} rcpt to(id),
x := 0
550(id),
x ≥ 10, x := 0
(b) At least 10 t.u. before “550”
error response
l0 l1l2
ΣP3
id
\ {rcpt to(id)}
rcpt to(id),
counter < max req ,
counter ++
rcpt to(id),
counter ≥ max req ,
counter ++, x := 0
ΣP3
id
\ {rcpt to(id)}ok 250 (id), error 550 (id)
x ≥ 5 x ≥ 10
(c) Different delays based on the response message
l0 l1l2
l3
ΣP4
id
\ {rcpt to(id)},
setMR(id ,max req)
rcpt to(id),
y < minD ∧ counter < max req ,
counter ++
rcpt to(id),
y < minD ∧ counter ≥ max req ,
counter ++, x := 0
rcpt to(id),
y ≥ minD ,
counter := 0
ok 250 (id),
y := 0 setMR(id ,max req)
ok 250 (id),
x ≥ del ,
y := 0
setMR(id ,max req)
ok 250 (id),
y := 0
setMR(id ,max req)
(d) Decrease or Increase delay dynamically
Fig. 3. Robust Mail Servers
6. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We have implemented a prototype tool in Python based on
the algorithms proposed in Pinisetty et al. (2012). Regarding
performance, note that the tool is a prototype, implemented
using open-source libraries and tools provided for quickly
prototyping algorithms based on timed automata. The purpose
of the tool is first to show feasibility and then to have a first
assessment of performance. An enforcement monitor for a P-
TAV instance is implemented with two concurrently running
processes (Store and Dump). The Store process takes care of
receiving input events, computing optimal delays of actions,
and storing them in memory, and the Dump process deals with
reading events stored in the memory and outputting them.
The tool inputs a property modeled with UPPAAL (Larsen et al.
(1997)) and stored in XML. We use UPPAAL as a library to
implement the update and post functions (see Pinisetty et al.
(2012)), and the PyUPPAAL library to parse the properties.
4 Experiments were conducted on an Intel Core i7-2720QM
(4 cores) at 2.20 GHz CPU, with 4 GB RAM, and running
on Ubuntu 10.10. To illustrate our experiments, we use the P-
TAV in Fig. 1b. In an indexed setting, we have an enforcement
monitor per session, we need a front-end mechanism to slice the
input trace, i.e., identify the monitor related to an input event,
based on the value of the parameter.
Algorithm 1 FrontEndProcess
Enforcers← {}
while tt do
(δ, a(p, c))← await(event)
e← Enforcers.get(p)
if (e 6= NONE) then
e.addEvent((δ, a(p, c)))
else
E = new Enforcer()
E.addEvent((δ, a(p, c)))
Enforcers.add(p,E)
end if
end while
Enforcement monitors can
be created and deleted
on-the-fly. As explained
in Sec. 4, some mecha-
nism is needed to split
the input trace based
on parameter values. For
slicing as in Chen and
Rosu (2009) but based
on a single parameter,
the simple procedure is
described in Algorithm 1.
We use an initially-empty
hash-map (Enforcers) to
keep track of active en-
4 Given an input state and event, the post function computes the state reached
in the underlying timed transition system of a P-TAV.
forcers. The “get” method takes the key as input, and returns
the associated enforcer, if present, and “NONE” otherwise. The
“addEvent” method adds an input event to the input queue of
the enforcer e. The “add” method adds the given key-value pair
to the hash-map. Algorithm 1 was implemented in Python. The
most expensive statement is the call to the “get” method, used
to search and retrieve the enforcer associated to a key value.
We measured the average execution time of the “get” method:
with 100 enforcers, and an input trace with equal number of
events per enforcer, we obtained 3.5 ms over 10,000 calls.
Results of performance analysis are presented in Table 1. We
have performed benchmarks for several runs until the variation
in the obtained values was negligible.
We performed experiments, varying the number of instances of
P-TAVs (entry N ). For example, N = 10 means that there are
10 instances, each differing only in the value of the parameter
ranging from 1 to 10.
N |tr| t EM t post
1 100 4.9 0.040
1 500 71 0.18
1 1000 305 0.38
10 100 1 0.0095
10 500 4.5 0.026
10 1000 19.3 0.043
20 100 0.8 0.0083
20 500 3.8 0.015
20 1000 10 0.023
30 100 0.7 0.079
30 500 3.1 0.012
30 1000 4.2 0.019
Table 1: Performance evaluation
The entry |tr | denotes the
length of the input timed
trace, generated using a
trace-generator. The entry
t EM denotes the total
time (in seconds) required
to process a given in-
put trace (and to com-
pute optimal delays). The
entry t post denotes the
time (in seconds) taken for
one call to the post func-
tion, upon receiving the last
event of the input trace.
The trace-generator bal-
ances the number of events
sent to each P-TAV instance.
Analysis. From Table 1, for a fixed value ofN , t post increases
as the length of the input trace increases. However, these values
should be almost equal. This known undesirable behavior is due
to the invocation of UPPAAL for realizing the post function
in the current implementation. The input trace is represented
as an automaton. After each event, the input trace grows (the
underlying automaton is updated), and the computation by
UPPAAL restarts from the initial state. From Table 1, we can
also observe that, given a fixed length for the input traces,
the total simulation time t EM decreases when N increases
because the number of enforcers (more concurrent processes)
increases, and thus more events are treated concurrently.
7. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
Our approach is by no means the first to consider paramet-
ric specifications in runtime monitoring and is inspired from
some previous endeavors proposed in the runtime verification
community. This paper extends a paper introducing runtime
enforcement for (propositional) timed properties (see Pinisetty
et al. (2012)). With more expressive specifications (with param-
eterized events, internal variables, and session parameters), we
improve the practicality and illustrate the usefulness of runtime
enforcement on application scenarios.
Handling parametric specifications in runtime monitoring.
Most of the frameworks handling parametric specifications deal
only with their verification. Note however that the Monitor-
ing Oriented Programming (MOP) framework, through the so-
called notion of handler, allows some form of runtime en-
forcement by executing an arbitrary piece of code on prop-
erty deviation. More generally, the usual questions addressed
in verification of parametric specifications include defining a
suitable semantics (that differs from the usual ones of model-
checking), and providing monitor-synthesis algorithms that
generate runtime-efficient mechanisms.
P-TAVs are inspired from existing parametric formalisms for
untimed properties. The idea of using a non-parametric specifi-
cation formalism along with an indexing mechanism according
to the values of parameters (aka the “plugin” approach) was first
proposed by the MOP team in Chen and Rosu (2009). In term
of indexing, our framework uses a subset of the possibilities
described in Chen and Rosu (2009) in that we use a totally-
ordered set to index monitors instead of a partially-ordered
set on bindings (i.e., partial functions from parameter names
to their domains). Note however that our approach can be
extended to multiple parameters using indexing mechanisms.
Parameters should get bound on the first events and all events
should carry values for all parameters (to ease the retrieval of
the associated monitors). Monitoring algorithms could remain
equivalent in terms of efficiency as monitor instances will be
accessible with one index. The restriction considered in this
paper allows to simplify the issue of indexing and determining
the compatible monitors, given an input event. The accept-
able expressiveness features related to parameters, their slic-
ing mechanisms, and their overhead, are certainly application-
dependent. Note also that MOP is restricted to propositional
formalisms to specify (indexed) plugin monitors while P-TAV
instances handle variables, guards, and assignments.
Distinguishing parameters from external variables (parameters
yield new instances of monitors while external variables get
rebound) was first introduced in Barringer et al. (2012) with
Quantified Event Automata (QEAs). QEAs feature a general
use of quantifiers over parameters but do not consider time.
Timed specification in monitoring techniques. Two usages
of timed specifications have been proposed for monitoring pur-
poses: i) rather theoretical efforts aiming at synthesizing moni-
tors, and ii) tools for runtime monitoring of timed properties. In
the first category, one seeks to obtain an operational mechanism
(close to a timed automaton) from a declarative description of
a property expressed in a timed logic such as TLTL3 in Bauer
et al. (2011) or MTL in Nickovic and Piterman (2010), Thati
and Rosu (2005) and Basin et al. (2011). In the second category,
the research efforts are tool-oriented. The Analog Monitoring
Tool (Nickovic and Maler (2007)) monitors specifications writ-
ten in STL/PSL over continuous signals. LARVA Colombo
et al. (2009) takes as input properties expressed as DATEs
(Dynamic Automata with Timers and Events) which basically
resemble timed automata with stop watches but also feature
resets, pauses, and can be composed into networks.
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